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Coordination is a widely employed term across recent quantitative and qualitative
approaches to intersubjectivity, particularly approaches that give embodiment and
enaction central explanatory roles. With a focus on linguistic and bodily coordination
in conversational contexts, I review the operational meaning of coordination in recent
empirical research and related theorizing of embodied intersubjectivity. This discussion
articulates what must be involved in treating linguistic meaning as dynamic processes
of coordination. The coordination approach presents languaging as a set of dynamic
self-organizing processes and actions on multiple timescales and across multiple
modalities that come about and work in certain domains (those jointly constructed in
social, interactive, high-order sense-making). These processes go beyond meaning at the
level that is available to first-person experience. I take one crucial consequence of this
to be the ubiquitously moral nature of languaging with others. Languaging coordinates
experience, among other levels of behavior and event. Ethical effort is called for by the
automatic autonomy-influencing forces of languaging as coordination.
Keywords: coordination, meaning making, languaging, ethics, social interaction, enaction, distributed cognition,
experience
It is an exciting time to be a philosopher of language, as long as
one is willing to look to what is happening in the language sci-
ences. Here one finds confirmation of the deep skepticism that
loomed throughout twentieth-century reflections on language:
there is no such (simple) thing. Language cannot be studied as
a phenomenon that is in any way separate from sensing, act-
ing, interacting physical bodies and complex material and social
worlds. What can a growing empirical and theoretical focus on
dynamic conversational behavior mean for meaning? One con-
sequence takes the form of a philosophical question: how can we
account for the inherently moral character of human interactions,
even as some aspects of our interactions are well explained by
self-organizing mechanisms?
In notoriously deflationary style, Richard Rorty sums up a
perennial philosophical view (shared by Wittgenstein (1953) and
Mead (2009), among others) when he describes language as
“noises and marks,” which work by provoking other noises and
marks. “To say that it [a given creature] is a language user is
just to say that pairing off the marks and noises it makes with
those we make will provide a useful tactic in predicting and
controlling its future behavior” (Rorty, 1989, p. 15). Following
Davidson, Rorty insists that language is not a medium, nei-
ther for expression nor representation (Rorty, 1989, p. 10). By
seeing language as just another coping behavior with social conse-
quences, he suggests, philosophers can get off the realism/idealism
“see-saw” and thereby get to ask more practical and politically
interesting questions. In particular, the upshot is that this view
“. . . naturalizes mind and language by making all questions about
the relation of either to the rest of the world causal questions,
as opposed to the adequacy of representation and expression”
(Rorty, 1989, p. 15).
Although this view is meant to espouse a “non-reductive
behaviorism” (presumably with emphasis on the modifier), it can
come off sounding somewhat emaciating. The “noises andmarks”
phrasing calls to mind Morse code, while the idea of predict-
ing and controlling a fellow conversant evokes Terminator-type
hyper-analytical visual perception that superimposes scrolling
lines of data on the target object in sight. (It was the 80s, after all.)
One can contrast this hollowing out of linguistic activity with a
different account that was developing in the same decade—that of
embodied cognitive linguistics. This research painted a radically
alternative picture, that of the richly imagistic and fleshy inner
life of metaphors and morphemes, all traceable to bodily struc-
tures and experiential patterns (e.g., Lakoff and Johnson, 1980;
Johnson, 1987; Wierzbicka, 1988, 1996).
Interestingly, work in cognitive science today, specifically in
the newly emerging paradigms of enaction, distributed cogni-
tion, and dynamical system approaches, indicates a return of the
Rortyan perspective. Throughout this social cognitive science, the
language of coordination increasingly is used to characterize not
only social interaction dynamics and communication processes,
but the workings of language itself (Clark, 1996; Fowler et al.,
2008; Fusaroli et al., 2012; Dale et al., 2013, inter alia).
Different kinds of coordination are measured in research on
language in interactional contexts. Some discuss coordination as
the alignment of cognitive representations or conceptual schemes
(Pickering and Garrod, 2004, 2014; Garrod and Pickering, 2009;
Tylén et al., 2013). Conversation participants converge on rep-
resentations by aligning “at many different levels, from basic
motor programs to high-level aspects of meaning” (Garrod and
Pickering, 2009, p. 293). Coordination understood as physical
entrainment is also studied as potentially significant for language
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in its own right (Cowley, 2007; Fowler et al., 2008; Shockley et al.,
2009; Riley et al., 2011). For example, Richardson et al. showed
that visual attention—where people look and when—can “be
coordinated on the basis of verbal contact alone” (Richardson
et al., 2007, p. 407). Unintentional synchrony in seemingly
non-linguistic phenomena such as posture and sway (Shockley
et al., 2003), as well as speech rate (Street, 1984), vocal inten-
sity (Natale, 1975), and pausing (Cappella and Planalp, 1981),
invites analysis of linguistic interactors as constituting “joint-
action systems” that can be studied as “non-decomposable units,”
or “self-organized dynamical systems that emerge from the non-
linear interactions and couplings that exist between and among
individuals and the environment” (Fowler et al., 2008, p. 265).
Fowler et al. (2008) for example find equivalence between inter-
personal and intra-personal rhythmic coordination; whether the
limbs in question belong to the same person or different people,
and whether they are coupled by sight or by neuro-musclar tis-
sue, “the same dynamical entrainment processes” operate (Fowler
et al., 2008). By attending to the sub-personal processes of coordi-
nation dynamics, a supra-personal “dialogical system” (to borrow
from Steffensen, 2012) comes into view.
Recent work refines the synchrony model of coordination
by introducing the idea of synergy (for a review, see Fusaroli
et al., 2014). A synergistic notion of coordination importantly
distinguishes complementarity rather than simultaneity as a key
characteristic of successful languaging. It also emphasizes the
emergent dynamics of interpersonal dyadic systems, now under-
stood not simply as dynamically orchestrated complex machines,
but as sites of social cognition. “Crucial to this synergistic model is
the emphasis on dialog as an emergent, self-organizing, interper-
sonal system capable of functional coordination” (Fusaroli et al.,
2014, p. 147).
The synergistic approach to conversational coordination dove-
tails well with the enactive theory of social interaction, participa-
tory sense-making, which likewise puts central explanatory weight
on interpersonal coordination processes and thus “allows us to
claim that social interaction constitutes a proper level of anal-
ysis in itself,” one that enjoys its own autonomy or “life of its
own” beyond the intentions of involved participants (De Jaegher
and Di Paolo, 2007, p. 491; see also p. 494). Tracing the con-
tours of coordination patterns and breakdowns, De Jaegher and
Di Paolo describe human sociality as arising precisely in the inter-
play of influences between emergent interaction dynamics and
the agents temporarily entrained by them (De Jaegher and Di
Paolo, 2007, p. 492; see also Di Paolo and De Jaegher, 2012).
Currently rounding out this coordination chorus, the distributed
language approach (e.g., Thibault, 2011) pairs the early enactive
autopoietic notion of languaging with the affordance paradigm of
ecological psychology. “Languaging involves a complex coordina-
tion of multiple activities emphasizing the dynamics of real-time
behavioral events that are co-constructed by co-acting agents”
(Jensen, 2014, p. 2, this issue).
The move to complementarity, synergy, and supra-individual
interaction dynamics arising from participatory coordination
brings with it a slew of critical consequences for traditional anal-
yses of conversational meaning-making, be they of philosophical
or more applied linguistics stripe. The most radical implication
of the coordination research is an overhaul in the definition of
language itself. Language is now to be seen as a set of dynamic
self-organizing processes and actions on multiple timescales and
across multiple modalities that come about and work in certain
domains (those jointly constructed in social, interactive, high-
order sense-making). This is a very radical turn, one with many
meanings. For example, on the basis of work in close kinship
with these approaches, we are poised to appreciate language as
multimodal (McNeill, 1992, 2005, 2012; Kendon, 2004; Streeck,
2009), and as a doing, i.e., as a “pragmatic and phonetic” rather
than propositional or abstract issue (Hodges et al., 2012, p. 501).
Furthermore, as Fusaroli et al. (2014) point out, taking this per-
spective is not merely a matter of stacking up new findings, but
of clearing out old attitudes. In order to make space for proper
appreciation of conversational synergy, they say we need to reject
two commonly assumed views: (1) the ultimate function [of con-
versational languaging] is not necessarily to reach deep mutual
understanding of each other nor to converge internal represen-
tations; it is rather to realize an activity together which might or
might not require deep mutual understanding (2) the function of
a conversation cannot be defined on the level of the individual: the
role of each individual component in a system. . .makes sense only
within the functional organization of the dyad. (2014, p. 150)
Several key shifts are thus advocated by the synergy approach: a
shift from individual to dyad in order to determine the functional
teleology of a conversational interaction, and a shift from under-
standing the meaning of conversational action in terms of “deep
mutual understanding” to the realization of a given and shared
purpose or task.
Such shifts imply major philosophical and ethical conse-
quences and raise a host of pressing questions (some to fol-
low). Yet notice that these pivotal implications were more or
less already there in the first-generation synchronous mech-
anism approach to conversational coordination. At root, the
problem of coordination is “how a device of very many inde-
pendent variables might be regulated without ascribing exces-
sive responsibility to an executive subsystem” (Turvey, 1990, p.
938). Coordination means law-like patterns of movement that
are emergent and self-organizing. Seeing language in this way
brings about the gestalt switch that Rorty was after: language
becomes a causal phenomenon, or better, a set of causal phenom-
ena, fully on par with forces and events in the natural physical
world.
The common heritage of coordination accounts of languag-
ing interaction is the site of a significant tension, then. Precisely
because language is a doing, a practical and physical as well as
social and cultural activity, it finds a ready place on a continuum
view of sense-making or fully embodied meaning generation,
a view trained on the intrinsic normativity of always-caring,
never neutral life in pursuit of life (Jonas, 1966; Di Paolo, 2005;
Thompson, 2007). Recent work found in enactive, distributed,
and dynamic proposals take this vantage point when they pro-
mote a nuanced and social picture of meaning-sharing. However,
the paradigmatic resources of mechanism, movement, and even
self-organization may be too thin, both epistemologically and
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ethically speaking, to account for the full significance and irre-
ducible complexity of everyday human conversing. They only give
us a birds’ eye view of the story, one somehow beyond the system
under observation.
I suggest that an adequately rich sense of meaning may be
missed even in the synergistic coordination accounts, not because
we lose track of skull-bound representations in adopting this
perspective, but because we lose sight of the consequences a con-
versation can have for individual lives and selves (see also Kyselo,
2014, this issue). It remains to be seen if synergistic coordination
gets us any further in our ability to explain how such conse-
quences follow from the marks and noises we so perfunctorily get
each other to make. (One may even notice that the coordination
view of social cognition outruns the Rorty–Davidsonian dream of
charitable anthropologists in the field: we are no longer predicting
each other’s moves, but are each and every one of us swept up in
a smaller-and-larger-than-self tide of constraining and entraining
languaging).
The challenge and the solution are the same: those of us inter-
ested in pursuing a radically non-representational, distributed,
participatory, and behaviorally-attuned account of human lan-
guaging must work toward a better understanding of human
embodied intersubjectivity as such. We are not pendulums. A
conversation is more than a multimodal juggling act. But we
do, in some ways, work like pendulums, and our conversa-
tions do fall into observable patterns and flows that may delight
onlookers, especially those with access to multiple regression
plots. It is exactly because as human social creatures we are
remarkably adept at synchrony and synergy, turn-taking and
rule-following, entraining each other and getting our movements
hijacked installed hallway face-offs, that we must pay closer atten-
tion to what our bodies always already know how to do in conver-
sational interactions. Empirical work supports the suspicion that
just because a conversation runs like a well-oiled machine, it does
not follow that interlocutors have jointly made or experienced
any good sense (see Galantucci and Roberts, 2014). One possibil-
ity for paying better attention to our conversational co-enactings
would be to investigate underexplored but highly relevant dimen-
sions of our embodiment, including bodily protest, dissonance,
discomfort, difference, and betrayal.
Richly intelligent and culturally elaborated as they are, our
bodies can and do betray us. Frequently this betrayal comes in
the form of habit. In 2007 I attended a talk that philosopher
Shannon Sullivan gave on race. She spoke of one dimension of
her experience of being a white southern woman: when peo-
ple get verbally aggressive with her or are rude to her, she
smiles. Seemingly against her will, her bodily practices carry
and enact stark traces of a specific social-cultural upbringing.
Despite her own frustration or discomfort, she habitually and
automatically carries forward specific norms of how to be with
others.
Social settings and scripts function similarly, assigning roles
that play out as counterintuitive bodily actions.When I was work-
ing as a waitress in an upscale fusion restaurant about a decade
ago, I once had a customer berate me and criticize my work in
a way that was nonetheless perfectly polite in word choice and
even in tone. But even as my body “took sides” with the insulting
customer, obediently clearing his unwanted food, nodding, step-
ping back with a lowered head and then calmly walking away, a
dissonance began to arise as a creeping feeling, the unsavory sense
of needing to shake something off my back and shoulders, a hot
tingle of anger as tears welled. There was a bodily knowledge that
something in that outwardly smooth interaction had gone awry.
I am not a mere billiard ball; my reactions are complex; and I do
not “process” the emotional consequences of interactions imme-
diately. With varying degrees of reflection and compassion, I can
learn from experiences of bodily-emotional dissonance as I sort
out the intra-individual tensions and unfold a broad range in
meaning in what has transpired.
I do not know how the customer felt after this interaction on
his side of things. One might imagine he felt smug and satisfied:
he ultimately (and without much waiting) got what he wanted
from his dining experience, and he imparted an important les-
son to an ignorant girl. He sat back, comfortable, sure. He folded
his hands on his belly. We both played our parts in the highly
scripted ritual. We had coordinated well. But the meaning of the
interaction was in no way the same for both of us.
There can be no denying the gendered and classed aspects
of these examples, the distinctive contributions of personal as
well as community histories. Our flesh-and-blood, inherently vul-
nerable, defensive embodiment senses and partially dictates the
meanings that interactions have for us—consequences in terms
of emotional experience, our possibilities for response and other
action, our understanding. Evaluative reactions are conditioned
by contexts, histories, and concern that can function as trigger
points [Damasio’s somatic marker hypothesis is one route toward
linking social events and physiological reactions (1996)]. Non-
similarity and non-identity in human embodiment thus act as
content-generating resources, as each unique intelligent body-
self enacts its own dance with symbols, second-order language
constraints, and situational dynamics (Cuffari and Jensen, 2014).
That each of us interprets events or sentences differently is a
basic motivator for communication and an on-going source of
meaning-granting normativity. It is through conflict, argument,
and negotiation that “deep mutual understanding” gets a chance
to occur (Cuffari, 2014).
From these examples we must also note and take seriously the
significant temporal dimensions of meaning unfolding, spilling
beyond the boundaries of a dyadic episode. Studies in dynamic
systems may be very useful here. Language is now understood as
including many timescales “from milliseconds of brain activity
to hundreds of milliseconds of individual cognitive processing,
seconds and minutes of interaction, months and years of lan-
guage acquisition, and hundreds of years of cultural language
evolution” (Ra˛czaszek-Leonardi, 2010, p. 269). While new devel-
opments in mobile measuring technology and statistical analysis
enable researchers to track the more micro of these timescales,
many of these are arguably beyond the reach of what is avail-
able to phenomenological, first personal conscious experience or
awareness during a languaging event. “If one agrees that language
has an important function of interindividual coordination, some
variables will pertain to this level, that is, the level of interac-
tion, and may not be easily accessible to individual experience”
(Ra˛czaszek-Leonardi, 2010, p. 275). But interactive coordination,
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as quickly or expertly as it may take place, nonetheless has com-
plex consequences for individual experience. Proper investigation
of these unfolding consequences will likely require identifying
the right timescale for this sort of meaning. Merlin Donald’s
“slow process” hypothesis proposes an “intermediate” time zone
for “complex events that extend over several hours (for exam-
ple, a game or conversation)” and points out that “adult humans
typically live, plan, and imagine their lives in this time range”
(Donald, 2007, p. 214). Donald sees the slow process as a uniquely
human capacity that co-evolved with cultural developments pre-
cisely to “handle the cognitive demands imposed by increasingly
complex distributed systems” (Donald, 2007, p. 214). The slow
process hypothesis implies a “deeper background vantage point,”
constituted by “a vastly extended working memory that serves as
the overseer of human mental life” (Donald, 2007, p. 220). This
presents a plausible physiological explanation for how individuals
are simultaneously players on the great, shared stage of life while
still maintaining a concrete experience and narrative sense of my
life.
In this article I have been endorsing or performing a particular
view of meaning as having to do with consequences. For example,
I have used phrases like “what does this approach mean for lan-
guage research” or “the interaction did not have the samemeaning
for both of us.” This sense cannot exhaust the rich notion of the
meaning of languaging, which as we have seen, is an always on
the move, dynamic phenomenon unfolding across timescales and
participants. Depending on the timescale one uses in observing
languaging, meaning may be apparent at the level of an event, as
in the way that mothers and babies complete each other’s actions
(Ra˛czaszek-Leonardi et al., 2013). In deconstructing a politician’s
television ad campaign, meaning may be seen at a social-systemic
level. Nevertheless, the sense of meaning as “carrying forward”
(Gendlin, 1962, 1997), as a series of changes or implications in
phenomenologically available felt sense and action possibilities,
is an important one that can and should be integrated into the
social-interactive turn in cognitive science. Mark Johnson sum-
marizes this pragmatist view of meaning, writing that human
meaning is that which “concerns the character or significance of a
person’s interactions with their environments,”
. . . the meaning of a thing is in its consequences for experience—
how it “cashes out” by way of experience, either actual or possible
experience. Sometimes our meanings are conceptually and propo-
sitionally coded, but that is merely the more conscious selective
dimension of a vast, continuous process of immanent meanings
that involve structures, patterns, qualities, feelings and emotions.
(Johnson, 2007, p. 10).
For some current proposals of how personal histories of culturally
situated embodied experience can inform the meaning of lan-
guaging acts (wordings, gestures, improvisational performances,
etc.), see Jensen, 2014; Koubová, 2014 (this issue); and Cuffari
et al. (2014).
As De Jaegher and Di Paolo point out, because sense-making
is “essentially embodied in action” it is “directly affected by
the coordination of movements in interaction” (De Jaegher
and Di Paolo, 2007, p. 497). This suggests that meaning (in
the sense I mean it) can be coordinated, or more precisely,
that interacting coordinates processes of meaning making (e.g.,
responsive embodied activities in the interaction). This obser-
vation presses the importance of ethical attunement. It tells us
an important thing: language approached as coordinating also
means that in conversational exchanges, emails, and elevator
rides, we are constantly getting coordinating and constrained, and
doing the same to others, whether or not we are aware of it. But
it does not say whether coordinating another’s sense-making will
have good or bad outcomes, or how we are to discriminate.
Immanent, embodied dimensions of our interactions—
personal experience, social position, habituated reactions, emo-
tional and physical vulnerabilities, and temporality—are our
sources of caring and evaluating. As ecological psychologist Bert
Hodges tells us, “The pragmatics of languaging and language can
thus largely be summarized as, learning how to be caring and
careful in our speaking and listening to each other. To care and
to be careful is to evaluate and select better and worse ways to
move” (Hodges et al., 2012, p. 503). What will count as better
or worse is sometimes immediately obvious and often an emer-
gent inter-personally produced or discovered quality. But this
is not always the case. The call to learning is a call to growth,
improvement, and change—it does not suggest that merely going
on interacting as we always do will suffice. Perhaps not every
interaction “task” requires deep mutual understanding. But if it
is true that “we converse in order to explore and create pos-
sibilities for doing something good together” (Hodges et al.,
2012, p. 503), it seems that mutual understanding is an impor-
tant element of conversational interaction. What will serve as
our teacher in this crucial learning process, what can act as our
normative guide, is our individual yet intersubjectively engaged
embodiment.
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